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Tool for Investigating Disease Transmission
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ABSTRACT Whole-genome sequencing of pathogens has recently been used to investigate disease outbreaks and is likely to play
a growing role in real-time epidemiological studies. Methods to analyze high-resolution genomic data in this context are still lacking,
and inferring transmission dynamics from such data typically requires many assumptions. While recent studies have proposed methods
to infer who infected whom based on genetic distance between isolates from different individuals, the link between epidemiological
relationship and genetic distance is still not well understood. In this study, we investigated the distribution of pairwise genetic distances
between samples taken from infected hosts during an outbreak. We proposed an analytically tractable approximation to this
distribution, which provides a framework to evaluate the likelihood of particular transmission routes. Our method accounts for the
transmission of a genetically diverse inoculum, a possibility overlooked in most analyses. We demonstrated that our approximation can
provide a robust estimation of the posterior probability of transmission routes in an outbreak and may be used to rule out transmission
events at a particular probability threshold. We applied our method to data collected during an outbreak of methicillin-resistant
Staphylococcus aureus, ruling out several potential transmission links. Our study sheds light on the accumulation of mutations in
a pathogen during an epidemic and provides tools to investigate transmission dynamics, avoiding the intensive computation necessary
in many existing methods.
P
ATHOGEN genomic data are rapidly becoming abundant,
and there is a demand for statistical methods to extract
meaningful conclusions from the wealth of information these
data provide. One of the most basic and frequently used—yet
imperfectly understood—comparative tools is the genetic dis-
tance between two samples [commonly deﬁned as the number
of single-nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) between the iso-
lates]. In the context of epidemiological investigations, genetic
distance can be used as a discriminatory value to determine
whether infected individuals belong to the same outbreak or
cluster or to rule out potential transmission events.
Genetic distance is central to the inference of transmission
routes—intuitively, the greater the similarity is between sam-
ples taken from two different hos t s ,t h em o r el i k e l yt h e ya r et o
have been involved in a transmission event. While in some
cases it may sufﬁce to identify the carrier of the genetically
closest pathogen isolate as the source of infection (Jombart
et al. 2011), this approach lacks any measure of uncertainty
and may result in a high false positive rate; it has been dem-
onstrated that estimation of a transmission network using ge-
netic distance data alone is associated with much uncertainty,
making the estimation of individual transmission routes impos-
sible (Worby et al. 2014). However, with a probabilistic inter-
pretation of genetic distances, given the relationship between
the hosts of pathogen samples, one can quantify the uncer-
tainty surrounding each potential transmission source and
establish general trends of transmission in the epidemic. Fur-
thermore, probabilistically weighted transmission routes may
also lead to improved estimates of heterogeneous transmission
rates from different subpopulations.
Many studies to date have developed methods to infer
routes of transmission based on genomic and epidemiolog-
ical data (Cottam et al. 2008; Jombart et al. 2011; Morelli
et al. 2012; Ypma et al. 2012, 2013; Didelot et al. 2014;
Jombart et al. 2014). Each method utilizes a likelihood com-
ponent that describes the probability that a set of mutations
occurs between two pathogen samples from different hosts,
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based on strong assumptions (e.g., transmission bottleneck
size of 1 or mutation occurring only at the time of trans-
mission), and many are highly computationally intensive.
The distribution of pairwise genetic distances between
samples taken from epidemiologically linked carriers depends
on numerous factors, such as the mutation rate, the within-
host pathogen population dynamics, and the transmission
bottleneck size. It is of interest to understand how each of
these factors affects observed genetic distance.
In this study, we aimed to investigate the distribution of
pairwise genetic distances to better understand how di-
versity accumulates during a disease outbreak. In particular,
we developed an approximation to this distribution and in-
vestigated its use as a tool to assess the likelihood of transmission
routes. We used simulated data and real outbreak data, collected
during a hospital outbreak of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus
aureus (MRSA), to demonstrate the ability of our method to rule
out several patient-to-patient transmission routes.
Methods
The distribution of genetic distance between two
samples taken during an outbreak
Consider a disease outbreak, consisting of n cases, where
case 1 is the origin, and cases 2;...;n each have a source
of infection from within the population. Let tI
j be the infec-
tion time of case j, and tI
1 ¼ 0: Each case is observed, and we
initially assume that one pathogen specimen is taken for
sequencing at time ts
j with genotype gj: Table 1 describes
notations used in this article.
We consider the unobserved transmission network,
which consists of infection routes and times. Let cj be the
vector of transmission ancestry for person j, such that the
ﬁrst element is the transmission source of j, and each suc-
cessive element is the source of the preceding element. Since
the network is fully connected, the ﬁnal element of this vector
for any given host will be the outbreak origin, and the vector
will have length equal to the number of hosts in the trans-
mission chain from the origin to j.L e tsij ¼ ci \ cj be the
vector of ancestry common to both i and j, such that the ﬁrst
element s
ð1Þ
ij is the most recent common transmission source
of both i and j, and the last element is 1.
Now consider the genealogy of the sampled isolates. This
tree is not necessarily identical to, but must be consistent
with, the transmission tree (Ypma et al. 2013). The time of
coalescence for samples gi and gj; denoted mðgi;gjÞ; must oc-
cur prior to the divergence of the transmission tree branches to
which persons i and j belong and will belong within one of the
hosts in sij: The ancestries of the samples coexist in the same
host or chain of hosts for a period of time, before one lineage is
transmitted to another person and exists independently of the
other. Let dði;jÞ be the time of lineage divergence, the time at
which the lineages cease to exist within the same host (see
Figure 1).
Let cðgi;gjÞ denote the genetic distance between samples
gi and gj; measured by the number of SNPs. The mutations
could have arisen in two distinct periods—ﬁrst, during the
time between observations tS
i ; tS
j and lineage divergence
dði;jÞ; and second, during the (earlier) time between lineage
divergence and coalescence mðgi;gjÞ: The number of SNPs
cðgi;gjÞ is then equal to the sum of two random variables,
cðgi;gjÞ¼X þ Y; where X represents mutations occurring
between lineage divergence and observation, and Y repre-
sents mutations occurring prior to lineage divergence. For
the former, we can assume that the number of SNPs arising
from the time of lineage divergence dði;jÞ until observation
follows a Poisson distribution with mean mðts
i þ ts
j 22dði;jÞÞ:
For the latter, with a known time of coalescence, mðgi;gjÞ;
the number of SNPs accumulating between coalescence and
divergence is again a Poisson-distributed random variable,
Yjmðgi;gjÞ Poisð2mðdði;jÞ2mðgi;gjÞÞÞ: (1)
However, the time of coalescence for two samples is
generally unknown, although it must lie in the interval
0#mðgi;gjÞ,dði;jÞ: If the size of the transmitted inoculum
is equal to one, then tI
s
ð1Þ
ij
#mðgi;gjÞ,dði;jÞ; in the scenario
depicted in Figure 1, coalescence would have to occur
within the host (rectangle) highlighted in a thick black line.
Most epidemic models describe nonlinear dynamics, and
estimating the rate of coalescence between two pathogen
samples during an outbreak is highly dependent on the
demographic model used (Koelle and Rasmussen 2012; Volz
2012). However, in this study, interest lies in the individual-
level rather than the population-wide dynamics. Under an
assumed or hypothesized set of transmission routes, the time
of lineage divergence dði;jÞ is known, and the rate of lineage
coalescence can be derived from the speciﬁcation of a model
of within-host population dynamics and transmission.
Assuming a constant population size of N, the time to
coalescence for two randomly sampled lineages at time t,
mt; is exponentially distributed with rate 1=N: Under this
assumption, it can be shown that the number of SNPs sep-
arating two randomly sampled lineages at time t follows
aG e o m ðð1=NÞ=ð1=N þ 2mÞÞ distribution, equivalent to
Geomð1=ð1 þ uÞÞ; where u ¼ 2Nm (Watterson 1975).
Table 1 Notation used in this article
Notation Deﬁnition
i/j Transmission route from person i to person j
tI
j Time of infection of person j
ts
j Time of genome sampling from person j
sij Vector of transmission ancestry common to persons i and j
dði;jÞ Time of lineage divergence
m Mutation rate per genome per generation
cða;bÞ Genetic distance (no. SNPs) between genomes a and b
mða;bÞ Coalescence time of isolates a and b
mt Time between coalescence and observation time t
NðtÞ Effective pathogen population size at time t
NB Effective transmission bottleneck size
1396 C. J. Worby et al.As such, by assuming a constant mutation rate and
effective population size prior to lineage divergence, we
have
X Poisðmðts
i þ ts
j 22dði;jÞÞÞ; (2)
and
Y  Geom
 
1
1 þ 2Nm
 
: (3)
However, as the lineage is transmitted from one host to
another, the population experiences repeated bottlenecks,
violating the assumption of constant population size. We
hence considered an approximation to the true population
dynamics, using a discrete-time population model. The effec-
tive population size remains constant at size N, except during
transmission, at which time it spends one generation in a bot-
tleneck of size NB; before recovering to its previous level. The
expected time to coalescence under such a model is
EðmtÞ¼
X t
k¼0
k
 
12
1
N
 k2fðkÞ21 
12
1
NB
 fðkÞ 
1
NðkÞ
 
; (4)
where fðkÞ is the number of bottlenecks a lineage must pass
through between times 0 and k, and NðkÞ is the effective
population size at time k and is equal to either N or NB: We
note that NðkÞ represents the short-term effective popula-
tion size that takes into account nonrandom sampling
during the bottleneck and stochastic variation, while
N*
e ¼ 1=E½mdði;jÞ  is the long-term effective population size
that also considers the changes in short-term effective pop-
ulation sizes over time. We can then either assume that the
time of coalescence is ﬁxed at mðgi;gjÞ¼dði;jÞ2Eðmdði;jÞÞ
and that
cðgi;gjÞ Poisðmðts
i þ ts
j 22mðgi;gjÞÞÞ
¼ Poisðmðts
i þ ts
j 22ðdði;jÞ2Eðmdði;jÞÞÞÞ
(5)
[the sum of random variables (1) and (2)] or that the
effective population size N*
e prior to divergence is ﬁxed at
1=E½mdði;jÞ  and that
cðgi;gjÞ Geom
 
1
1 þ 2E½mdði;jÞ m
!
þ Poisðmðts
i þ ts
j 22dði;jÞÞÞ (6)
[the sum of random variables (2) and (3)], which we refer
to as the geometric-Poisson approximation. Finally, we can
derive the posterior probability of any transmission route
(i/j), given the genetic distance between sampled isolates
gi and gj and associated parameters v ¼ fm;E½mdði;jÞ g,
pði/jjcðgi;gjÞ;vÞ¼
pðcðgi;gjÞji/j;vÞpði/jjvÞ
pðcðgi;gjÞjvÞ
¼
pðcðgi;gjÞji/j;vÞ
P
k2SðjÞpðcðgk;gjÞjk/j;vÞ
;
(7)
assuming equal prior probabilities of potential transmission
routes, where SðjÞ is the set of all potential infection sources
for individual j.
Simulation studies
We generated the empirical distribution of genetic distances
by simulating within-host dynamics on top of a transmission
process. We compared the resulting empirical distributions
with the geometric-Poisson approximation given in Equation
Figure 1 Two isolates sampled from infected
cases during an outbreak. Each infected case
is depicted by a rectangle, corresponding to
its infectious period. Arrows denote transmis-
sion events. Samples gi (red circle) and gj (blue
circle) are taken from persons i and j, respec-
tively. The colored lines indicate the ancestry of
each isolate back to its most recent common
ancestor at time mðgi;gjÞ: Hosts shaded in gray
denote the shared ancestry sij; while blue and
red denote the lineages of the genotypes gi and
gj; respectively. The colored bars at the bottom
of the diagram show the distinct time periods in
which mutations may occur—between diver-
gence and observation (blue and red) and from
divergence to coalescence (purple), which is ex-
ponentially distributed, assuming a constant
population N.
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index case of the disease outbreak is infected with a clonal
population of bacteria, and this is allowed to grow under
a discrete-time neutral evolutionary process. At each gener-
ation, x   BinomðNðtÞ;NðtÞ=2NÞ cells die, and the remain-
ing NðtÞ2x cells are replicated, where NðtÞ denotes the
census population size at time t. We impose the restriction
x,NðtÞ to prevent the population from going extinct. Each
replicated cell has a probability m of being a mutation. All
mutations are assumed to be neutral, and back mutations
are allowed. A transmission event involves a bottleneck: NB
cells are randomly sampled from the host and passed to the
susceptible individual. In reality, this inoculum is unlikely to
be a truly random sample from the pathogen population,
since a host is not a well-mixed vessel. However, NB can
be thought of as an effective bottleneck size.
Initially, we considered the simple example of a transmission
chain, in which each infected individual infects exactly one
new person. Transmission events occur at equidistant intervals,
and the time from infection to sampling is constant. For each
scenario under given parameters, we repeated the transmis-
sion chain 100 times and considered the average distribution
of pairwise distance across these simulations.
We also simulated more general susceptible–infectious–
removed (SIR) outbreaks in an initially susceptible popula-
tion, using the R package “seedy” version 0.1 (Worby 2014).
Genotypes were sampled randomly from the host at regular
intervals, and person-to-person mixing in the population
was assumed to be homogeneous. Outbreaks were simu-
lated with R0 ¼ 2: We investigated the effect of varying
the bottleneck size NB; the equilibrium effective population
size Neq; and the mutation rate m.
Data
We applied our approximations to a data set collected during
an outbreak of MRSA. Colonization of MRSA strain type
ST2371 was detected in a total of 15 newborn infants during
an outbreak in a special care baby unit (SCBU) in Cambridge,
United Kingdom. A single genome sampled from each of these
individuals was sequenced, along with 20 isolates collected
from a healthcare worker (HCW), who was found to be MRSA
positive several weeks after the 15 cases were observed. The
genetic similarity of the pathogens a m p l e si n d i c a t e dp o t e n t i a l
transmission, (i) from patient to patient, via a transiently
colonized HCW (transferring the bacteria from one patient to
a n o t h e r ,w i t hc a r r i a g ec l e a r e du p o nh a n dw a s h i n g ) ;( i i )
between persistently colonized HCW and patient; or (iii) from
external sources. This study was described by Harris et al.
(2013), and sequence data are available at the European Nu-
cleotide Archive (www.ebi.ac.uk/ena).
Results
Within-host diversity
We ﬁrst considered the distribution of pairwise genetic
distances between isolates sampled from a single host. The
distance between two isolates sampled at the same time
point will be geometrically distributed according to the
geometric-Poisson approximation (6), since the Poisson
component is equal to zero. However, assuming infection
with a single genotype, the empirical distribution generated
from simulations can vary from this approximation (Figure
2A). This is a consequence of assuming a constant coales-
cent rate—under this simpliﬁcation, it is assumed that the
time to coalescence is exponentially distributed, while in
reality, coalescence is much more likely to occur in the very
early stages of infection, while the total within-host patho-
gen population is still expanding. With less uncertainty sur-
rounding the coalescent time, pairwise genetic distance is
approximately Poisson distributed, as in Equation 5. As the
time since infection increases, the probability that coales-
cence occurred in the initial growth phase decreases, and
the constant coalescent rate assumption of the geometric-
Poisson approximation becomes more realistic.
For individuals infected with an inoculum containing
multiple genotypes, the coalescence time of sampled line-
ages may occur within a previous host. As such, the ini-
tial diversity within a newly infected host is higher, and
equilibrium levels of diversity are approached sooner than
for a clonally infected host. This leads to better agreement
between the empirical and geometric-Poisson distributions
(Figure 2C).
The expected and empirical mean diversities are con-
sistently similar, even when the empirical and expected
distributions differ (Figure 3). However, for observations
made soon after the time of infection, the approximate dis-
tribution may overestimate the frequency of genetically
identical isolates. In situations where the timing of coales-
cence is more certain, for example, shortly after a bottleneck
of size 1 (a “strict” bottleneck), a pure Poisson approxima-
tion (Equation 5) may be more appropriate (Figure 2B). We
used Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) to determine the
better approximation at various time points after a strict
bottleneck, ﬁnding the cutoff for the Poisson approxima-
tion to increase with population size Neq (Supporting
Information, Table S1).
Pairwise diversity along transmission chains
We next looked at the distribution of genetic distances
arising from each pair of individuals in the transmission
chain, simulated as described in Methods. Under most sce-
narios, the geometric-Poisson approximation correctly de-
scribed the increasing mean and variance of the distribution
as samples were taken farther down the transmission chain
(Figure 3), with little apparent bias to the empirical mean
(Figure S1). As the chain length increases, the genetic distri-
butions reach an equilibrium, as the expected diversity of
each transmission inoculum becomes constant.
Notably, there is considerable overlap between SNP
distributions,meaningthatthelikelihoodofobservingagenetic
distance between samples from two individuals will be similar
for a range of transmission network conﬁgurations. This has
1398 C. J. Worby et al.ramiﬁcations for identifying the source of infection, since the
posterior probability of any particular transmission route will
t y p i c a l l yb el o w ,a n dm u c hu n c e r t a i n t yw i l lb ea s s o c i a t e dw i t h
the estimated network.
Identifying direct transmission
The geometric-Poisson distribution can be used to calculate
the probability that an observed genetic distance arose from
a direct transmission event. In the case where the trans-
mission bottleneck is equal to one, the distribution of
distances arising from samples taken from a transmission
pair does not depend on the previous structure of the
transmission network, so a probability for direct trans-
mission can be derived independently of the outbreak
structure.
We simulated SIR outbreaks and calculated the posterior
probability of transmission for every pair of individuals given
observed genetic distances, as derived in Equation 7. We
found that the posterior probability of transmission routes
corresponded well with the empirical probability calculated
under repeated simulation (Figure 4). In File S1 and Figure
S2, we describe a simulated disease outbreak and demon-
strate the identiﬁcation of potential transmission routes using
the maximum likelihood, as well as the ability to rule out
transmission routes at the 5% level.
To test the approximation as a tool for investigating
transmission networks, we repeatedly simulated SIR outbreaks
and assessed the likelihood of direct transmission between
each pair of individuals, using a single sampled genotype from
each host. Identiﬁcation of the source of infection via maximum
likelihood was consistently more successful than selection of the
host with the genetically closest genotype. Furthermore, source
identiﬁcation was more successful for higher mutation rates. A
heuristic approach, in which the infection route was selected if
a potential source was both the maximum-likelihood estimate
and the genetically closest host, was successful around one-third
o ft h et i m e( T a b l e2 ) .
With a bottleneck size .1, the time of coalescence of the
two sampled lineages may occur in previous hosts, and the
expected time of coalescence depends on timing of bottle-
necks in the bacterial population. Past population dynamics,
and therefore previous transmission history, would be re-
quired to assess individual transmission links. To avoid
conditioning on the remainder of the tree structure, we
calculated the likelihood under the assumption that pre-
vious bottlenecks occurred at intervals equal to the
expected serial interval. While we found that higher pos-
terior probabilities were often underestimated using this
approach (Figure S3), maximum-likelihood identiﬁcation
still consistently outperformed selection of the genetically
closest host (Table S2).
We additionally compared our approach to the software
“outbreaker” (Jombart et al. 2014) and “seqTrack” (Jombart
et al. 2011) and found that it could identify more transmis-
sion routes correctly in many scenarios. However, differen-
ces in modeling assumptions mean the methods are not
Figure 2 The empirical (solid lines) and estimated (dashed lines) distribution of genetic distances for sampling within host at speciﬁed times after
infection. Both the geometric-Poisson approximation (A and C) and the simpler Poisson approximation (B and D) are shown. The infected host was
infected by an inoculum of size 1 (A and B) and size 5 (C and D). The inoculum was a random sample from a bacterial population having evolved over
a period of 5000 generations from an initial clonal population. Mutation rate is 0.002, and effective population size is 2000.
Distribution of Genetic Distances 1399directly comparable. More details can be found in File S1
and Table S3.
Investigating transmission routes during a hospital
MRSA outbreak
We used the MRSA data set described in Methods to inves-
tigate transmission routes in a real outbreak. We compared
observed genetic distances to the geometric-Poisson approx-
imation, to determine likely transmission routes. MRSA-positive
patient episodes and swab times are shown in Figure 5A.
We initially investigated potential patient-to-patient trans-
mission, ignoring the possibility that the HCW may have
infected patients. We assumed a bacterial generation time of
30 min (Chang-Li et al. 1988; Dengremont and Membré 1995;
Ender et al. 2004) and used the mutation rate of one SNP per
15 weeks (equivalent to 0.0002 per genome per generation)
quoted in the study by Harris et al. (2013). We assumed a strict
bottleneck. We found that, since the time from infection to
sampling was typically short, the within-host effective popula-
tion size made little difference to the approximated distribu-
tions. Five temporally consistent transmission routes could be
ruled out at the 5% level, leaving ﬁve plausible transmission
events (Figure 5C). Two of these form a cycle (between 11 and
12)—only one of these events could have occurred, but each
route is equally plausible. The lack of any other observed and
temporally consistent infection source within the ward suggests
transmission from an external source or environmental con-
tamination—however, since the infants in this study were non-
ambulatory, this possibility was considered less likely.
We next supposed that the HCW could have been the source
of infection for any of the patients in the SCBU. The observed
mean pairwise distance between the samples collected from the
HCW was 3.89 SNPs (Figure 5B), suggestive of a lengthy car-
riage time or a nonstrict bottleneck size. The time of HCW
infection was estimated to be 23 days before the ﬁrst patient
case (Harris et al. 2013). We set the observed genetic distance
f r o mp a t i e n tt oH C Wa st h en e a r e s ti n t e g e rt ot h em e a no ft h e
genetic distances to each of the HCW’s2 0s a m p l e s .W ef o u n d
that all patients could plausibly have been infected by the
HCW; however, in three cases this was not the most likely
source of infection (Figure 5D). Assuming that infection must
have a source from within the SCBU (including the HCW), we
found that in addition to the six individuals with no other
temporally consistent source, three patients had a posterior
probability of .99% of acquiring infection from the HCW,
while two others had a .50% probability. We additionally re-
peated the analysis, using each of the HCW’s isolates individu-
ally (Figure S4). Furthermore, we ran the analysis using the
Figure 3 Genetic distance between
each pair of cases in a transmission
chain. The ði;jÞth plot represents the
empirical distribution of the genetic dis-
tance between samples taken from indi-
viduals i and j (red bars). The diagonal
represents the within-host diversity for
each of the 10 cases in the transmission
chain (blue bars). Overlaid on each plot
is the expected distribution (black line),
based the geometric-Poisson approxi-
mation. The expected mean is marked
with a dashed line, while the empirical
mean and standard error bar are marked
in red (blue for within host). The within-
host equilibrium pathogen population
was 10,000, with a bottleneck size of 5.
1400 C. J. Worby et al.Poisson approximation, ﬁnding little difference in transmission
route probabilities (Figure S5).
We ﬁnally investigated the possibility that the HCW was
infected by one of the patients on the ward. Assuming that the
HCW was infected 2 days after the infection time of the potential
source, we could rule out ﬁve patients as a source of infection for
the HCW at the 5% level. If the HCW was infected by any one of
the patients, the observed diversity within the HCW is greater
than would be expected to accumulate in the period from
infection to observation. At least 16% of the observed HCW
within-host pairwise distances would be rejected at the 5% level
under any patient–HCW transmission scenario (Table S4).
We found that, while most of our analyses were fairly
robust to the speciﬁcation of the effective population size,
there was sensitivity to the choice of mutation rate and the
time of HCW infection. We investigate these sensitivities in
detail in File S1 and Table S5.
The methods we have described and implemented are for
pairwise distances and, as such, cannot account for dependen-
cies between several isolates. This is necessary when consid-
ering the transmission network as a whole, rather than just
a set of pairwise connections. In addition, it is necessary to
consider the conditional distribution of genetic distance to
account for multiple samples per host. The degree of de-
pendence varies considerably depending on the transmission
bottleneck size (Figure S6, Figure S7). In File S1,w ed e s c r i b e
the conditional distribution for genetic distances.
Discussion
In this study, we have explored the distribution of the genetic
distances arising from samples taken from infected hosts
during an outbreak and investigated the impact of factors
such as mutation rate, transmission dynamics, and within-
host pathogen population dynamics on the expected value of
such distances. Under most circumstances, a geometric-
Poisson approximation is sufﬁcient to describe genetic
distances between samples taken during an outbreak. This
allows the distribution to be approximated without knowing
the coalescence time of two lineages. With known parameters
of pathogen population dynamics, the likelihood of genetic
distances arising between a host and various potential trans-
mission sources may be compared, and certain links may be
excluded. The transmission bottleneck size can have a large
impact on the genetic distance distribution, and our methods
can account for this.
The ability to assign a genetic distance threshold to rule
out transmission events in a nonarbitrary fashion can be
important in establishing distinct subgroups of the transmission
tree, as well as identifying pathogen importation from outside
of the studied population. This is of much importance when
estimating transmission rates within a community, as incorrectly
identiﬁed importations can introduce bias. Previous studies
have used an arbitrary cutoff to determine potential trans-
mission (e.g., Jombart et al. 2014; Long et al. 2014).
We found that the geometric-Poisson approximation
deviated from the empirical distribution to the greatest
extent when sampling occurred shortly after infection with
a clonal inoculum. While the expected genetic distance exhibited
no apparent bias, and this deviation was minor for bottleneck
sizes .1, it should be noted that this scenario may potentially be
important in outbreaks of highly symptomatic pathogens, as
samples are more likely to be taken in the earlier stages of in-
fection, compared to asymptomatic, chronic infections. If a strict
bottleneck is considered likely shortly before sampling, using the
Poisson distribution (Equation 5) with ﬁxed coalescent time is
recommended.
Identiﬁcation of transmission sources using this method
is most successful with a high mutation rate. While higher
mutation rates (and longer intervals between infection and
onward transmission) can lead to more distinct distribu-
tions, potentially allowing one to rule out certain relation-
ships, such as direct transmission, it is clear that even under
extreme scenarios, uncertainty remains. We found that the
success rate of identifying the source of infection was up to
33% better than selection of the genetically closest host, but
still too low to identify transmission routes with conﬁdence.
We demonstrated that our approach could identify trans-
mission routes more successfully than existing software pack-
ages, provided key values, such as mutation rate and infection
times, are known. It has been shown previously that identiﬁ-
cation of transmission routes during an outbreak based on
g e n o m i cd a t ai sl i k e l yt ob ec h a l l e n g i n gd u et oh i g hl e v e l so f
uncertainty (Worby et al. 2014), a ﬁnding also reﬂected in
recent investigations (Didelot et al. 2014). The methods pro-
v i d e di nt h i sa r t i c l ea r el i k e l yt ob em o s tv a l u a b l ei nt h ei d e n -
tiﬁcation of a group of potential sources with a high likelihood,
as well as the elimination of potential sources at a given probability
Figure 4 The empirical probability that a proposed transmission route is
correct for a range of posterior probabilities calculated under the geometric-
Poisson assumption. A total of 100 outbreaks were simulated and the
posterior probability of direct transmission was calculated for every pair of
infected individuals. Counts were collated into 10% probability bins and
for each bin, the proportion of true transmission routes was calculated.
Error bars depict the 95% exact binomial conﬁdence interval.
Distribution of Genetic Distances 1401level (discriminating, for example, between imported cases
and within-population transmission events). Additional data
sources, such as spatial location, contact patterns, and infec-
tious periods, will increase the precision of estimates of in-
fection paths (Ypma et al. 2012, 2013; Jombart et al. 2014).
We demonstrated the application of our methods to
a data set collected during an MRSA hospital outbreak.
We could rule out 5 of the 11 temporally consistent patient-
to-patient transmission routes at the 5% level and found
evidence supporting the important role played by the
colonized HCW in the outbreak. However, our analysis was
limited by a number of important parameter values that are
uncertain or unknown. This work highlights the importance
of deriving estimates for the transmission bottleneck size and
gaining an improved understanding of within-host pathogen
population dynamics. With less parameter uncertainty, it
would be possible to draw more robust conclusions. Our
analysis considered only sequence data, but other data
sources could contribute valuable information to infection
routes. For instance, we assume an uninformative prior
distribution for infection sources, but contact patterns could
potentially be factored into this, if such information were
available.
While using our approximation to the genetic distance
distribution can be useful to assess pairwise individuals for
evidence of direct transmission, reconstruction of the full
transmission network requires us to consider the conditional
distribution of genetic distances and a framework to sample
over the entire structure. Accounting for dependencies be-
tween genetic distances would require inference of the set of
coalescent times. This approach has been described in
a recent study (Ypma et al. 2013), which used sequence data
directly, rather than genetic distance data. It may be possible
to implement the distribution approximation described here,
accounting for dependencies by conditioning on shared tree
branches.
The transmission bottleneck size is important in the
analysis of transmission dynamics, using genomic data. Most
studies to date assume a strict bottleneck for convenience, as
under this condition, the expected distance between two
samples does not depend on pathogen population dynamics
prior to the divergence of the lineages to different hosts.
Previous studies have suggested a diverse transmission
inoculum for inﬂuenza (Hughes et al. 2012; Murcia et al.
2012), while it is thought that the bottleneck size for bacterial
transmission could vary dramatically (Balloux 2010). Con-
ducting inference under the incorrect bottleneck size can gen-
erate misleading results. Our methods illustrate the degree to
which the bottleneck size can affect the expected genetic
distance between individuals and may potentially be used
to assess whether a strict bottleneck is a realistic assumption.
There are several assumptions made in this work. First,
we have assumed neutral evolution, such that no ﬁtter
mutant can arise and dominate the pathogen population.
This may be a reasonable assumption in the short term, such
as during individual carriage and in small outbreaks, but
would have to be taken into account when considering
epidemics over a long period of time. However, transmission
route inference is most applicable to localized outbreaks
within a community or a hospital, and the emergence of
ﬁtter variants may be of lesser importance. We have also
assumed that the within-host pathogen population remains
at equilibrium level and that this is identical for all infected
individuals, while in reality this may be unrealistic, espe-
cially during antimicrobial use. Within-host pathogen dy-
namics are still poorly understood, and the effective size
may ﬂuctuate and vary considerably between hosts. We
have primarily considered long-term bacterial infections,
with a relatively stable within-host population, but alterna-
tive models could also be considered, provided the expected
time of coalescence can be estimated at any given time. With
appropriate sampling, methods exist to estimate the within-
host effective population size, as well as the mutation rate
(e.g., Wang 2001; Minin et al. 2008). With known transmis-
sion routes, our approximation can also be used to estimate
parameters of interest; however, these estimates are associ-
ated with some uncertainty (see File S1, Figure S8 and Fig-
ure S9). We assumed that the source of infection must come
from the pool of observed infectives at the time of infection
and furthermore that the time of infection is known. In some
Table 2 Performance of geometric-Poisson distribution
Performance
measure
Mutation rate (31024)
135
Proportion of true infection sources identiﬁed by maximum likelihood 0.27 0.32 0.33
Proportion of true infection sources identiﬁed by closest genotypea 0.19 0.27 0.29
Proportion of potential links ruled out at 5% level 0.10 0.21 0.24
Proportion of true infection sources ruled out at 5% level 0.04 0.07 0.07
Proportion of cases identiﬁed as source by both maximum likelihood
and genetic similarity found to be correct
0.27 0.33 0.35
SIR outbreaks with 30 initial susceptibles were simulated and a single genome sample was generated for each infective. Simulations with a ﬁnal size
,20 were discarded. For each infective, the maximum-likelihood source was calculated, and the genetically closest hosts were selected. All
previously infected individuals were considered potential sources, regardless of removal times. Simulations for each scenario were repeated 100
times. Baseline parameters were infection rate 0.002, removal rate 0.001, and effective population size 5000.
a If the true source and other hosts are genetically equidistant, the true host is assumed to be identiﬁed with probability 1/(no. equidistant closest
hosts).
1402 C. J. Worby et al.cases, particularly for outbreaks in large, well-mixing com-
munities, it is unlikely that all infected cases will be identi-
ﬁed and sampled. Nonetheless, evidence for an external
source of infection can be seen when all potential observed
sources are ruled out (for instance, cases 2 and 8 in the
MRSA outbreak when not considering the HCW). In many
cases, transmission times are unknown, although for many
infections this can be estimated from the time of symptom
onset or at least narrowed down by swabs for pathogen
presence. Although one can test the hypothesis that an in-
dividual was infected at a certain time, this is a source of
uncertainty, particularly for scenarios with a lengthy, asymp-
tomatic infection period and/or a low pathogen mutation
rate.
Genetic distances are an important and frequently used
feature of genome sequence data, and our work contributes
to a better understanding of how such distances arise during
an outbreak. While sequence data provide a wealth of
information regarding evolutionary history and relatedness
of genotypes, the phylogeny derived from such data by itself
may not be informative of transmission dynamics, and
methods to combine this structure with the transmission
tree are complex and computationally intensive (Ypma et al.
2013). Genetic distances offer a simple summary statistic of
complex multidimensional data and may be more appropri-
ate in comparative analyses of genomic samples. Genetic
distances can crudely be used to determine direct transmis-
sion, via selection of the genetically closest host, but our
simulations demonstrate that this approach may frequently
be misleading. The geometric-Poisson approximation offers
a less arbitrary method of quickly assessing the likelihood of
direct transmission without requiring computationally inten-
sive Monte Carlo sampling strategies. It may additionally
provide an important component in the development of a full
Figure 5 Data and transmission route inference for the MRSA outbreak in the SCBU. (A) Patient episodes are shown as horizontal bars, with colored
circles representing positive and negative swab results. (B) The observed pairwise genetic distances between the 20 sequenced isolates collected from
the HCW. (C) Inferred transmission routes are shown, excluding the possibility of HCW–patient transmission. Red dashed lines indicate routes excluded
at the 5% level. All temporally consistent transmission routes are shown. Posterior probability is 100% unless stated. (D) Inferred transmission routes,
including the HCW as a potential source. The HCW is marked as a blue square.
Distribution of Genetic Distances 1403transmission network reconstruction methodology based on
genetic distance data.
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 ﾠ
1.	 ﾠEstimation	 ﾠof	 ﾠparameters	 ﾠ
While	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGeometric-ﾭ‐Poisson	 ﾠdistribution	 ﾠappears	 ﾠto	 ﾠapproximate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdistance	 ﾠdistribution	 ﾠunder	 ﾠsimulation	 ﾠwell,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠassumption	 ﾠthat	 ﾠseveral	 ﾠkey	 ﾠparameters	 ﾠof	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠare	 ﾠknown	 ﾠ–	 ﾠnamely,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmutation	 ﾠrate,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
equilibrium	 ﾠeffective	 ﾠpopulation	 ﾠsize	 ﾠwithin-ﾭ‐host,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbottleneck	 ﾠsize.	 ﾠWith	 ﾠa	 ﾠknown	 ﾠtransmission	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠ(for	 ﾠ
instance,	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠa	 ﾠhousehold	 ﾠ(COWLING	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2010)),	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠto	 ﾠestimate	 ﾠsome	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠquantities.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠsimulated	 ﾠ
an	 ﾠoutbreak	 ﾠand	 ﾠassumed	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠset	 ﾠof	 ﾠ25	 ﾠtransmission	 ﾠpairs	 ﾠwas	 ﾠobserved.	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠS8	 ﾠshows	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlikelihood	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ
data	 ﾠunder	 ﾠa	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠvalues	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmutation	 ﾠrate	 ﾠand	 ﾠeffective	 ﾠpopulation	 ﾠsize.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠestimate	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeffective	 ﾠpopulation	 ﾠ
size	 ﾠis	 ﾠuncertain,	 ﾠsince	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdata	 ﾠare	 ﾠless	 ﾠinformative	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠparameter;	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠextreme	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠcoalescence	 ﾠ
occurs	 ﾠimmediately	 ﾠprior	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtime	 ﾠof	 ﾠlineage	 ﾠdivergence,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlikelihood	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠdepends	 ﾠonly	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmutation	 ﾠ
rate.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠbottleneck	 ﾠsize	 ﾠcan	 ﾠadditionally	 ﾠbe	 ﾠestimated.	 ﾠObservation	 ﾠof	 ﾠmultiple	 ﾠgenotypes	 ﾠshortly	 ﾠafter	 ﾠa	 ﾠbottleneck	 ﾠevent	 ﾠ
suggests	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbottleneck	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠenough	 ﾠto	 ﾠallow	 ﾠdiversity	 ﾠthrough;	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠS9	 ﾠshows	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlikelihood	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
observing	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠnumbers	 ﾠof	 ﾠSNPs	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠhost	 ﾠshortly	 ﾠafter	 ﾠtransmission,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠbottleneck	 ﾠsizes.	 ﾠ
Again,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠestimates	 ﾠare	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠvery	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠuncertainty,	 ﾠparticularly	 ﾠfor	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠbottleneck	 ﾠsizes.	 ﾠ
However,	 ﾠit	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠto	 ﾠtest	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhypothesis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbottleneck	 ﾠsize	 ﾠis	 ﾠstrict,	 ﾠan	 ﾠassumption	 ﾠfrequently	 ﾠmade	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
transmission	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠreconstruction	 ﾠmethods.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
2.	 ﾠSimulated	 ﾠoutbreak	 ﾠ
Figure	 ﾠS2	 ﾠshows	 ﾠa	 ﾠsimulated	 ﾠSIR	 ﾠoutbreak	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ25	 ﾠinfected	 ﾠindividuals,	 ﾠ18	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠsampled	 ﾠgenotype.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠ
considered	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelative	 ﾠlikelihood	 ﾠof	 ﾠobserving	 ﾠa	 ﾠgenetic	 ﾠdistance	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠhosts,	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠtransmission	 ﾠhas	 ﾠ
occurred	 ﾠ(Figure	 ﾠS2,	 ﾠbottom	 ﾠleft).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠmaximum	 ﾠlikelihood	 ﾠestimate	 ﾠof	 ﾠtransmission	 ﾠsource	 ﾠwas	 ﾠcorrect	 ﾠin	 ﾠeight	 ﾠout	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
17	 ﾠtransmission	 ﾠevents.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠcomparison,	 ﾠselecting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgenetically	 ﾠclosest	 ﾠisolate	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsource	 ﾠwas	 ﾠcorrect	 ﾠin	 ﾠseven	 ﾠ
cases,	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsome	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese,	 ﾠmultiple	 ﾠhosts	 ﾠwere	 ﾠequally	 ﾠclose.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
For	 ﾠany	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠinfected	 ﾠhost,	 ﾠa	 ﾠgenetic	 ﾠdistance	 ﾠthreshold	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠspecified,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠused	 ﾠto	 ﾠrule	 ﾠout	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠ
transmission	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠlevel.	 ﾠConsider	 ﾠthe	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠlabelled	 ﾠ‘N’	 ﾠin	 ﾠfigure	 ﾠS2,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠsample	 ﾠat	 ﾠtime	 ﾠ1000.	 ﾠ
Under	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgeometric-ﾭ‐Poisson	 ﾠapproximation	 ﾠwith	 ﾠstrict	 ﾠbottleneck,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠof	 ﾠdrawing	 ﾠa	 ﾠsample	 ﾠdiffering	 ﾠby	 ﾠ4	 ﾠ
SNPs	 ﾠor	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠat	 ﾠtime	 ﾠ1000	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠhost	 ﾠis	 ﾠless	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ5%.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠsuch,	 ﾠsix	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeleven	 ﾠpreviously	 ﾠinfected	 ﾠ
individuals	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠruled	 ﾠout	 ﾠas	 ﾠtransmission	 ﾠsources	 ﾠat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠlevel.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtime	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠsamples	 ﾠand/or	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbottleneck	 ﾠ
size	 ﾠincrease,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠthreshold	 ﾠalso	 ﾠincreases.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
3.	 ﾠComparison	 ﾠwith	 ﾠtransmission	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠestimation	 ﾠsoftware	 ﾠpackages.	 ﾠ
‘Outbreaker’	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠR	 ﾠpackage	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinvestigation	 ﾠof	 ﾠindividual-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠtransmission	 ﾠdynamics	 ﾠusing	 ﾠgenomic	 ﾠdata	 ﾠ
(JOMBART	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2014),	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠ‘seqTrack’	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠearlier	 ﾠand	 ﾠsimpler	 ﾠmethod,	 ﾠimplemented	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ‘adegenet’	 ﾠpackage	 ﾠ
(JOMBART	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2011).	 ﾠThese	 ﾠsoftware	 ﾠpackages	 ﾠare	 ﾠarguably	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠaccessible	 ﾠtools	 ﾠfor	 ﾠestimating	 ﾠa	 ﾠtransmission	 ﾠ
network	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠat	 ﾠpresent,	 ﾠand	 ﾠas	 ﾠsuch,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠwanted	 ﾠto	 ﾠcompare	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠperformance	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠour	 ﾠmethod.	 ﾠGiven	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
user-ﾭ‐specified	 ﾠinfectivity	 ﾠdistribution	 ﾠand	 ﾠone	 ﾠgenomic	 ﾠsample	 ﾠper	 ﾠinfected	 ﾠhost,	 ﾠoutbreaker	 ﾠimplements	 ﾠan	 ﾠMCMC	 ﾠC.	 ﾠJ.	 ﾠWorby	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ 3SI	 ﾠ
algorithm	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠestimates	 ﾠthe	 ﾠposterior	 ﾠedge	 ﾠprobabilities	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnetwork,	 ﾠalong	 ﾠwith	 ﾠseveral	 ﾠparameters	 ﾠof	 ﾠinterest,	 ﾠ
including	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmutation	 ﾠrate.	 ﾠUnlike	 ﾠour	 ﾠmodel,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠtherefore	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠrequire	 ﾠinfection	 ﾠtimes	 ﾠand	 ﾠmutation	 ﾠ
rate	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠknown	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠcan	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbe	 ﾠused	 ﾠto	 ﾠdetect	 ﾠimportations	 ﾠinto	 ﾠa	 ﾠpopulation),	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠit	 ﾠoperates	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠless	 ﾠ
sophisticated	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠof	 ﾠwithin-ﾭ‐host	 ﾠdynamics	 ﾠ–	 ﾠmutations	 ﾠare	 ﾠassumed	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠfeature	 ﾠof	 ﾠtransmission,	 ﾠand	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
infected	 ﾠhost	 ﾠis	 ﾠadequately	 ﾠrepresented	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠsingle	 ﾠsequenced	 ﾠpathogen	 ﾠisolate.	 ﾠseqTrack	 ﾠidentifies	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgenetically	 ﾠ
closest	 ﾠpathogen	 ﾠsample	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsource,	 ﾠusing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspecified	 ﾠmutation	 ﾠrate	 ﾠto	 ﾠbreak	 ﾠties.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠalso	 ﾠassumes	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠeach	 ﾠhost	 ﾠis	 ﾠrepresented	 ﾠby	 ﾠone	 ﾠgenomic	 ﾠsample.	 ﾠ
We	 ﾠsimulated	 ﾠoutbreaks	 ﾠunder	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠassumptions,	 ﾠand	 ﾠattempted	 ﾠto	 ﾠidentify	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtransmission	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠusing	 ﾠour	 ﾠ
likelihood	 ﾠapproach,	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoutbreaker	 ﾠand	 ﾠseqTrack	 ﾠfunctions.	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoutbreaker	 ﾠpackage	 ﾠcan	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbe	 ﾠused	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠsimulate	 ﾠoutbreaks,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠperformed	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠassumptions	 ﾠmentioned	 ﾠpreviously,	 ﾠso	 ﾠwe	 ﾠinstead	 ﾠsimulated	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
within-ﾭ‐host	 ﾠpathogen	 ﾠdynamics	 ﾠexplicitly,	 ﾠas	 ﾠdescribed	 ﾠin	 ﾠMethods.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠused	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠtransmission	 ﾠroutes	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
compare	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠmethods.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠran	 ﾠoutbreaker	 ﾠwith	 ﾠno	 ﾠspatial	 ﾠmodel,	 ﾠand	 ﾠdetection	 ﾠof	 ﾠimportations	 ﾠsuppressed.	 ﾠ
Furthermore,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠassumed	 ﾠa	 ﾠflat	 ﾠinfectivity	 ﾠdistribution.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠemphasize	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthese	 ﾠapproaches	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠ
comparable,	 ﾠsince	 ﾠoutbreaker	 ﾠand	 ﾠseqTrack	 ﾠaccommodate	 ﾠunknown	 ﾠinfection	 ﾠtimes,	 ﾠand	 ﾠoutbreaker	 ﾠfurthermore	 ﾠ
estimates	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmutation	 ﾠrate,	 ﾠgiving	 ﾠour	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠan	 ﾠadvantage	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcomparison.	 ﾠResults	 ﾠare	 ﾠpresented	 ﾠin	 ﾠTable	 ﾠS2.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
4.	 ﾠMRSA	 ﾠoutbreak	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠ
While	 ﾠthe	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠprovided	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmain	 ﾠtext	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠestimates	 ﾠof	 ﾠtransmission	 ﾠroutes	 ﾠunder	 ﾠplausible	 ﾠparameter	 ﾠ
values	 ﾠfound	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠliterature,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠgreat	 ﾠdeal	 ﾠof	 ﾠuncertainty	 ﾠsurrounding	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠwithin-ﾭ‐host	 ﾠpathogen	 ﾠpopulation	 ﾠ
dynamics,	 ﾠand	 ﾠas	 ﾠsuch,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠrepeated	 ﾠthe	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠunder	 ﾠa	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠassumptions.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠmutation	 ﾠrate	 ﾠused	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmain	 ﾠ
analysis	 ﾠwas	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpaper	 ﾠdescribing	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdataset;	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmutation	 ﾠrate	 ﾠof	 ﾠMRSA	 ﾠhas	 ﾠpreviously	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠestimated	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠ(3×10
−6
	 ﾠper	 ﾠnucleotide	 ﾠper	 ﾠyear,	 ﾠequivalent	 ﾠto	 ﾠ5×10
−4
	 ﾠper	 ﾠgenome	 ﾠper	 ﾠgeneration	 ﾠ(HARRIS	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ
2010;	 ﾠYOUNG	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2012)),	 ﾠso	 ﾠwe	 ﾠrepeated	 ﾠthe	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthis	 ﾠvalue.	 ﾠWith	 ﾠthis	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠmutation	 ﾠrate,	 ﾠa	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠrange	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠgenetic	 ﾠdistances	 ﾠare	 ﾠplausible,	 ﾠand	 ﾠas	 ﾠsuch,	 ﾠfewer	 ﾠroutes	 ﾠwere	 ﾠexcluded	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ5%	 ﾠlevel.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠHCW	 ﾠwas	 ﾠa	 ﾠplausible	 ﾠ
source	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmost	 ﾠpatients	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠward,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgenetic	 ﾠdistance	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠpatients	 ﾠ1	 ﾠand	 ﾠ5	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHCW	 ﾠwere	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
similar	 ﾠthan	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠexpected,	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠthis	 ﾠinfection	 ﾠroute.	 ﾠNo	 ﾠpatient	 ﾠto	 ﾠHCW	 ﾠtransmission	 ﾠroute	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠexcluded	 ﾠ
at	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ5%	 ﾠlevel.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Changing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeffective	 ﾠpopulation	 ﾠsize	 ﾠhad	 ﾠa	 ﾠlimited	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠestimated	 ﾠtransmission	 ﾠroute	 ﾠestimates.	 ﾠValues	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
2000	 ﾠand	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠproduced	 ﾠnear	 ﾠidentical	 ﾠposterior	 ﾠprobabilities.	 ﾠPrevious	 ﾠstudies	 ﾠhave	 ﾠestimated	 ﾠnasal	 ﾠcarriage	 ﾠof	 ﾠS.	 ﾠ
aureus	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠan	 ﾠeffective	 ﾠpopulation	 ﾠsize	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠ50-ﾭ‐4000	 ﾠ(YOUNG	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2012;	 ﾠGOLUBCHIK	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2013).	 ﾠWe	 ﾠ
experimented	 ﾠwith	 ﾠan	 ﾠeffective	 ﾠpopulation	 ﾠsize	 ﾠof	 ﾠ100,	 ﾠfinding	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfive	 ﾠpatient-ﾭ‐HCW	 ﾠroutes,	 ﾠand	 ﾠseven	 ﾠHCW-ﾭ‐patient	 ﾠ
routes	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠexcluded	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ5%	 ﾠlevel.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Varying	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtime	 ﾠat	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHCW	 ﾠbecame	 ﾠinfected	 ﾠhad	 ﾠan	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠon	 ﾠposterior	 ﾠtransmission	 ﾠprobabilities.	 ﾠMoving	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠforward	 ﾠin	 ﾠtime	 ﾠdecreases	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠSNPs	 ﾠexpected	 ﾠto	 ﾠaccumulate	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtime	 ﾠof	 ﾠobservation.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
HCW	 ﾠinfection	 ﾠtime	 ﾠwas	 ﾠ164	 ﾠdays	 ﾠafter	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠupper	 ﾠbound	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrange	 ﾠprovided	 ﾠby	 ﾠ(HARRIS	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2013),	 ﾠ
five	 ﾠpatients	 ﾠremain	 ﾠtemporally	 ﾠconsistent	 ﾠwith	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠinfected	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHCW.	 ﾠTwo	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠtransmission	 ﾠ
routes	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠexcluded	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ5%	 ﾠlevel.	 ﾠC.	 ﾠJ.	 ﾠWorby	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ 4SI	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
We	 ﾠrepeated	 ﾠour	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠusing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpure	 ﾠPoisson	 ﾠmodel.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠgeneral,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdistribution	 ﾠhas	 ﾠa	 ﾠshorter	 ﾠright	 ﾠtail	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
geometric-ﾭ‐Poisson	 ﾠdistribution,	 ﾠand	 ﾠas	 ﾠsuch,	 ﾠcan	 ﾠlead	 ﾠto	 ﾠmore	 ﾠtransmission	 ﾠroutes	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠrejected	 ﾠat	 ﾠa	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠ
probability	 ﾠlevel.	 ﾠWith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠassumptions	 ﾠas	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmain	 ﾠtext,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHCW-ﾭ‐patient	 ﾠroutes	 ﾠwere	 ﾠtypically	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
higher	 ﾠposterior	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPoisson	 ﾠdistribution,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠsource	 ﾠof	 ﾠinfection	 ﾠremained	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
same	 ﾠfor	 ﾠall	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠ(Figure	 ﾠS5).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
5.	 ﾠConditional	 ﾠdistributions	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
We	 ﾠdefine	 ﾠa	 ﾠphylogenetic	 ﾠsubtree	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunique	 ﾠset	 ﾠof	 ﾠbranch	 ﾠsegments	 ﾠlinking	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠisolates,	 ﾠoriginating	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtime	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠcoalescence.	 ﾠThen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgenetic	 ﾠdistance	 ﾠψ(g1,g2)	 ﾠis	 ﾠdependent	 ﾠon	 ﾠanother	 ﾠdistance	 ﾠψ(g3,g4) 	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
intersection	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠphylogenetic	 ﾠsubtrees.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠconditional	 ﾠdistribution	 ﾠof	 ﾠone	 ﾠgenetic	 ﾠdistance	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠanother	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
ψ(g1,g2)|ψ(g3,g4)~ Bin ψ(g3,g4),
length of intersection
length of subtree(g3,g4)
⎛
⎝ ⎜
⎞
⎠ ⎟
                                         +Pois{µ((length of subtree(g1,g2))−(length of intersection))}
	 ﾠ
(8)	 ﾠ
Figure	 ﾠS7	 ﾠshows	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠconfigurations	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠphylogenetic	 ﾠand	 ﾠtransmission	 ﾠtree	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthree	 ﾠinfected	 ﾠcases.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠ
both	 ﾠsettings,	 ﾠψ(g2,g3)	 ﾠdepends	 ﾠon	 ﾠψ(g1,g2)	 ﾠvia	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmutations	 ﾠoccurring	 ﾠalong	 ﾠbranch	 ﾠb3 .	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsequences	 ﾠat	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠnodes	 ﾠare	 ﾠknown,	 ﾠor	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠinferred,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠestimation	 ﾠis	 ﾠunnecessary,	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠmutations	 ﾠ
along	 ﾠany	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠbranch	 ﾠsegment	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcalculated.	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠsince	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgenealogy	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠtypically	 ﾠobserved,	 ﾠand	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠnecessarily	 ﾠcorrespond	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtransmission	 ﾠnetwork,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠunder	 ﾠa	 ﾠstrict	 ﾠbottleneck	 ﾠ(PYBUS	 ﾠand	 ﾠRAMBAUT	 ﾠ2009;	 ﾠ
YPMA	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2013),	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠan	 ﾠapproximation	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠuseful	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinference	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfull	 ﾠnetwork,	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmultiple	 ﾠ
samples	 ﾠper	 ﾠhost.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Transmission	 ﾠchains	 ﾠof	 ﾠlength	 ﾠ3	 ﾠwere	 ﾠsimulated	 ﾠto	 ﾠinvestigate	 ﾠconditional	 ﾠdistributions	 ﾠof	 ﾠgenetic	 ﾠdistances.	 ﾠTimes	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠinfection	 ﾠto	 ﾠsampling	 ﾠand	 ﾠonward	 ﾠtransmission	 ﾠwere	 ﾠidentical	 ﾠfor	 ﾠall	 ﾠcases.	 ﾠWith	 ﾠa	 ﾠstrict	 ﾠbottleneck,	 ﾠψ(g2,g3)	 ﾠ
varies	 ﾠonly	 ﾠminimally	 ﾠwith	 ﾠψ(g1,g2),	 ﾠbut	 ﾠψ(g1,g3)	 ﾠshows	 ﾠa	 ﾠclear	 ﾠdependency.	 ﾠBoth	 ﾠdistances	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
greater	 ﾠvalues	 ﾠof	 ﾠψ(g1,g2)	 ﾠunder	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠbottlenecks	 ﾠ(Figure	 ﾠS6).	 ﾠWith	 ﾠa	 ﾠstrict	 ﾠbottleneck,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠscenario	 ﾠin	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠS7B	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠimpossible,	 ﾠand	 ﾠas	 ﾠsuch,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠintersection	 ﾠof	 ﾠsubtrees	 ﾠ(g1,g2)	 ﾠand	 ﾠ(g2,g3)	 ﾠis	 ﾠrelatively	 ﾠsmall.	 ﾠWith	 ﾠan	 ﾠincreasing	 ﾠ
bottleneck	 ﾠsize,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠof	 ﾠscenario	 ﾠB,	 ﾠand	 ﾠtherefore	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠlength	 ﾠof	 ﾠsubtree	 ﾠoverlap,	 ﾠincreases.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
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Figure S1. Differences between empirical and estimated pairwise genetic distances using the 
Geometric-Poisson approximation. The (i, j) th plot shows the difference between the empirical 
and simulated mean distance between samples taken from individuals i  and  j . Each plot shows 
the underestimate for various levels of bottleneck size and mutation rate (light, medium and dark 
points denote 1x10
-4, 3x10
-4, and 5x10
-4 respectively). Plots above the diagonal show 
underestimates for equilibrium population size 10000, while below the diagonal, Neq=1000. 
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Figure S2. A simulated outbreak. 24 individuals are infected in a simulated SIR outbreak, of 
which 18 have sampled genotypes. Each individual has an infectious period shown as a gray bar, 
with genotypes shown as colored circles, the color denoting the genetic distance from the first 
sample (top). One randomly sampled genome for each individual is used to assess the likelihood 
of direct transmission from each other sampled individual. The pairwise genetic distances are 
shown (bottom right), with black boxes denoting the true source of infection, and gray boxes 
denoting presence at the time of infection. The relative likelihood of direct transmission using the 
geometric-Poisson approximation is shown for each pair (bottom left, green and red indicating 
high and low relative likelihood respectively). Crosses indicate the maximum likelihood estimate, 
while circles indicate the genetically closest isolate to each sample.  
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Figure S3. The empirical probability that a proposed transmission route correct for a range of 
posterior probabilities calculated under the geometric-Poisson assumption. A total of 100 
outbreaks were simulated with a bottleneck size of 5; transmission events prior to the host were 
assumed to occur at intervals equal to the mean generation interval. The posterior probability of 
direct transmission was calculated for every pair of infected individuals. Counts were collated into 
10% probability bins and for each, the proportion of true transmission routes calculated. Error 
bars depict the 95% exact binomial confidence interval. C.	 ﾠJ.	 ﾠWorby	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Figure S4. Transmission network in the SCBU, using each HCW isolate individually. HCW is 
shown as a blue square, potential transmission routes are shown as arrows. Red dashed arrows 
denote transmission routes rejected at the 5% level using the geometric-Poisson approximation. 
For each of the 20 HCW isolates, posterior transmission probabilities were calculated individually, 
and the mean and range of values are indicated on the plot. C.	 ﾠJ.	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 ﾠet	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Figure S5. Transmission network in the SCBU, using the pure Poisson approximation. HCW is 
shown as a blue square, potential transmission routes are shown as arrows. Red dashed arrows 
denote transmission routes rejected at the 5% level using the Poisson approximation. 
 C.	 ﾠJ.	 ﾠWorby	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ 11SI	 ﾠ
            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                 
                 
                  
                  
       
 
 
 
 
            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
                                   
 
 
Figure S6. Simulated conditional distributions of genetic distances arising from a transmission 
chain of length 3. Each row shows plots for ψ(g1,g3) and ψ(g2,g3) given various levels of 
ψ(g1,g2) (denoted by different colors). Bottleneck size varies by row. Equilibrium size was set to 
10000, and mutation rate µ = 3×10
−4 . C.	 ﾠJ.	 ﾠWorby	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ 12SI	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Figure S7. Two possible phylogenetic configurations in a transmission chain of length 3. (A) 
Lineages g2  and g3 coalesce within host 2. (B) Lineages g2  and g3 coalesce within host 1, 
prior to the coalescence of g1  and g2 . This configuration is possible only with a bottleneck of 
size > 1. 
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Figure S8. Likelihood of observing 28 pairwise genetic distances between known transmission 
pairs, given a range of values for the mutation rate and the effective population size. The dashed 
lines indicate parameter values under which the data were simulated, and the geometric-Poisson 
maximum likelihood value is marked. Maximum likelihood value calculated using the Nelder-Mead 
method in the ‘optim’ function in R. 
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Figure S9. Likelihood curves for various within-host genetic distance observations, given a range 
of transmission bottleneck sizes. The effective population size and mutation rate are assumed to 
be known. The likelihood is calculated assuming samples are taken 50 generations after a 
transmission event; the maximum likelihood estimate of bottleneck size for each genetic distance 
is marked as a filled circle. 
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Table	 ﾠS1.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠapproximated	 ﾠand	 ﾠempirical	 ﾠdistributions	 ﾠfor	 ﾠwithin-ﾭ‐host	 ﾠgenetic	 ﾠdistances.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
range	 ﾠof	 ﾠµNeq 	 ﾠand	 ﾠtimes	 ﾠsince	 ﾠclonal	 ﾠinfection,	 ﾠAkaike’s	 ﾠInformation	 ﾠCriterion	 ﾠ(AIC)	 ﾠis	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠfor	 ﾠboth	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgeometric-ﾭ‐
Poisson	 ﾠ(GP)	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPoisson	 ﾠ(P)	 ﾠapproximation.	 ﾠ250	 ﾠsimulated	 ﾠpathogen	 ﾠpopulations	 ﾠwere	 ﾠgenerated,	 ﾠand	 ﾠfor	 ﾠeach,	 ﾠ
1000	 ﾠpairwise	 ﾠdistances	 ﾠwere	 ﾠrecorded	 ﾠat	 ﾠeach	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsample	 ﾠtimes.	 ﾠCells	 ﾠare	 ﾠshaded	 ﾠaccording	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlower	 ﾠAIC	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠ
–	 ﾠred	 ﾠfor	 ﾠPoisson,	 ﾠgreen	 ﾠfor	 ﾠgeometric-ﾭ‐Poisson.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠmutation	 ﾠrate	 ﾠwas	 ﾠ0.001	 ﾠper	 ﾠgenome	 ﾠper	 ﾠgeneration.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Effective	 ﾠpopulation	 ﾠsize,	 ﾠNeq 	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ	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 ﾠ84445	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ84162	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 ﾠ GP:	 ﾠ115043	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P:	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	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 ﾠ
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 ﾠ
P:	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ
GP:	 ﾠ708912	 ﾠ
P:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ984256	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ692577	 ﾠ
P:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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Table	 ﾠS2.	 ﾠProportion	 ﾠof	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠtransmission	 ﾠroutes	 ﾠidentified	 ﾠby	 ﾠboth	 ﾠmaximum	 ﾠlikelihood	 ﾠ(ML)	 ﾠand	 ﾠgenetic	 ﾠsimilarity.	 ﾠ
SIR	 ﾠoutbreaks	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ30	 ﾠinitial	 ﾠsusceptibles	 ﾠwere	 ﾠsimulated	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠsingle	 ﾠgenome	 ﾠsample	 ﾠwas	 ﾠgenerated	 ﾠfor	 ﾠeach	 ﾠ
infective.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠscenarios	 ﾠwith	 ﾠbottleneck	 ﾠsize	 ﾠ>1,	 ﾠit	 ﾠwas	 ﾠassumed	 ﾠthat	 ﾠtransmission	 ﾠevents	 ﾠprior	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinfection	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
source	 ﾠoccurred	 ﾠat	 ﾠintervals	 ﾠequal	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmean	 ﾠgeneration	 ﾠinterval.	 ﾠSimulations	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠfinal	 ﾠsize	 ﾠ<20	 ﾠwere	 ﾠdiscarded.	 ﾠ
For	 ﾠeach	 ﾠinfective,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmaximum	 ﾠlikelihood	 ﾠsource	 ﾠwas	 ﾠcalculated	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgeometric-ﾭ‐Poisson	 ﾠapproximation,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠgenetically	 ﾠclosest	 ﾠhosts	 ﾠselected.	 ﾠSimulations	 ﾠfor	 ﾠeach	 ﾠscenario	 ﾠwere	 ﾠrepeated	 ﾠ100	 ﾠtimes.	 ﾠBaseline	 ﾠparameters:	 ﾠ
infection	 ﾠrate	 ﾠ0.002,	 ﾠremoval	 ﾠrate	 ﾠ0.001,	 ﾠeffective	 ﾠpopulation	 ﾠsize	 ﾠ5000.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Mutation	 ﾠrate	 ﾠ(×10
−4
)	 ﾠ 1	 ﾠ 3	 ﾠ 5	 ﾠ
Bottleneck	 ﾠsize	 ﾠ 1	 ﾠ 5	 ﾠ 25	 ﾠ 1	 ﾠ 5	 ﾠ 25	 ﾠ 1	 ﾠ 5	 ﾠ 25	 ﾠ
Prop.	 ﾠroutes	 ﾠidentified	 ﾠby	 ﾠML	 ﾠ 0.27	 ﾠ 0.21	 ﾠ 0.21	 ﾠ 0.32	 ﾠ 0.23	 ﾠ 0.22	 ﾠ 0.33	 ﾠ 0.24	 ﾠ 0.21	 ﾠ
Prop.	 ﾠroutes	 ﾠidentified	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
genetic	 ﾠsimilarity	 ﾠ
0.19	 ﾠ 0.17	 ﾠ 0.15	 ﾠ 0.27	 ﾠ 0.20	 ﾠ 0.18	 ﾠ 0.29	 ﾠ 0.22	 ﾠ 0.19	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Table	 ﾠS3.	 ﾠProportion	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorrect	 ﾠtransmission	 ﾠroutes	 ﾠidentified	 ﾠusing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgeometric	 ﾠPoisson	 ﾠlikelihood,	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ‘outbreaker’	 ﾠand	 ﾠ‘seqTrack’	 ﾠfunctions.	 ﾠA	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠof	 ﾠ25	 ﾠoutbreaks	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ30	 ﾠsusceptible	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠwere	 ﾠsimulated	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
each	 ﾠscenario,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠoutbreaks	 ﾠterminating	 ﾠwith	 ﾠfewer	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ20	 ﾠinfections	 ﾠexcluded.	 ﾠR0	 ﾠwas	 ﾠset	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ2,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠwithin-ﾭ‐
population	 ﾠsize	 ﾠ5000.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠoutbreaker,	 ﾠno	 ﾠspatial	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠwas	 ﾠdefined,	 ﾠimportation	 ﾠidentification	 ﾠwas	 ﾠsuppressed,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠinfectivity	 ﾠdistribution	 ﾠwas	 ﾠspecified	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠuniform.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠseqTrack,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmutation	 ﾠrate	 ﾠwas	 ﾠprovided.	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠsource	 ﾠand	 ﾠother	 ﾠhosts	 ﾠare	 ﾠgenetically	 ﾠequidistant,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠhost	 ﾠis	 ﾠassumed	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠidentified	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠ1/(#	 ﾠequidistant	 ﾠclosest	 ﾠhosts).	 ﾠ
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Parameters	 ﾠ Network	 ﾠidentification	 ﾠmethod	 ﾠ
Mutation	 ﾠrate	 ﾠ Inoculum	 ﾠsize	 ﾠ ML	 ﾠestimate	 ﾠ outbreaker	 ﾠ seqTrack	 ﾠ Closest	 ﾠgenotype
a	 ﾠ
0.002	 ﾠ 1	 ﾠ 0.28	 ﾠ 0.20	 ﾠ 0.14	 ﾠ 0.21	 ﾠ
0.002	 ﾠ 5	 ﾠ 0.26	 ﾠ 0.19	 ﾠ 0.13	 ﾠ 0.17	 ﾠ
0.002	 ﾠ 10	 ﾠ 0.24	 ﾠ 0.19	 ﾠ 0.14	 ﾠ 0.16	 ﾠ
0.005	 ﾠ 1	 ﾠ 0.28	 ﾠ 0.20	 ﾠ 0.13	 ﾠ 0.22	 ﾠ
0.005	 ﾠ 5	 ﾠ 0.22	 ﾠ 0.18	 ﾠ 0.12	 ﾠ 0.18	 ﾠ
0.005	 ﾠ 10	 ﾠ 0.21	 ﾠ 0.21	 ﾠ 0.13	 ﾠ 0.17	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
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Table	 ﾠS4.	 ﾠProportion	 ﾠof	 ﾠobserved	 ﾠwithin-ﾭ‐host	 ﾠpairwise	 ﾠdistances	 ﾠrejected	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ5%	 ﾠlevel,	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠassumption	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
HCW	 ﾠinfection	 ﾠoccurred	 ﾠ2	 ﾠdays	 ﾠafter	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinfection	 ﾠtime	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpatient.	 ﾠProportions	 ﾠwere	 ﾠcalculated	 ﾠunder	 ﾠboth	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
geometric-ﾭ‐Poisson	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpure	 ﾠPoisson	 ﾠapproximations.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Source	 ﾠof	 ﾠHCW	 ﾠ
infection	 ﾠ
Proportion	 ﾠof	 ﾠwithin-ﾭ‐host	 ﾠpairwise	 ﾠdistances	 ﾠ
rejected	 ﾠat	 ﾠ5%	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠ
Geometric-ﾭ‐Poisson	 ﾠ Poisson	 ﾠ
Patients	 ﾠ1-ﾭ‐6	 ﾠ 0.16	 ﾠ 0.48	 ﾠ
Patients	 ﾠ7-ﾭ‐14	 ﾠ 0.25	 ﾠ 0.48	 ﾠ
Patients	 ﾠ15	 ﾠ 0.35	 ﾠ 0.48	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ
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Table	 ﾠS5.	 ﾠTransmission	 ﾠroutes	 ﾠexcluded	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ5%	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠunder	 ﾠa	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠscenarios.	 ﾠ
Mutation	 ﾠ
rate	 ﾠ
Eff.	 ﾠPop.	 ﾠ
Size	 ﾠ
HCW	 ﾠinfection	 ﾠ
time	 ﾠ(relative	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
first	 ﾠcase)	 ﾠ
HCW	 ﾠruled	 ﾠout	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
patient	 ﾠsource	 ﾠ
Patients	 ﾠruled	 ﾠout	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠHCW	 ﾠsource	 ﾠ
0.0002	 ﾠ 3000	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐23	 ﾠ NA	 ﾠ 8,9,10,13,14	 ﾠ
0.0005	 ﾠ 3000	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐23	 ﾠ NA	 ﾠ NA	 ﾠ
0.0002	 ﾠ 10000	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐23	 ﾠ NA	 ﾠ 8,9,10,13,14	 ﾠ
0.0002	 ﾠ 100	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐23	 ﾠ NA	 ﾠ 8,9,10,13,14	 ﾠ
0.0002	 ﾠ 3000	 ﾠ 164	 ﾠ 1-ﾭ‐10,13,14	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
0.0002	 ﾠ 3000	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐251	 ﾠ NA	 ﾠ –	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ